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FCC v. SCHREIBER: IN CAMERA AND THE
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY
SHm1wAN L. CoHN* and HAR VEY L. ZUcKMAN**
Obtaining protection for business secrets in an agency proceeding
is at best an imperfect art. The lack of any uniform rule and the con-fusion and delay which result from an ad hoc approach are highlighted
by FCC v. Schreiber. The authors examine the current state of the law
in light of the Schreiber decision and point up the present inequities.
Their conclusion is that the situation can only be remedied by enactment
of regulatory in camera procedures for all federal agencies. A model for
such a regulation is appended to the article.
Nearly every successful business possesses information as to its op-
erations which, in a desire to protect its position, it safeguards from
disclosure. This information may be as diverse as the formula for a
product, a marketing agreement with distributors, a list of customers,
or a production cost figure. Disclosure of such information could jeop-
ardize an industrial empire.
Trade and business secrets, like wives and children, become "hos-
tages to fortune"'1 when involved in public proceedings such, as civil
litigation or administrative investigations. No better example of this
can be found than Coca-Cola Co. v. Joseph C. Wlirthman Drug Co.,' in
which the Coca-Cola Company sued a purchaser of its syrup for diluting
the company's product. The Eighth Circuit affirmed a district court
dismissal of the action on the ground that Coca-Cola had intentionally
omitted proof of the exact formula of its own product, an element
deemed essential to establishing that the defendant had sold an adul-
terated product. Coca-Cola undoubtedly considered the loss to be the
lesser of two evils. But this was not a necessary result. As Dean Wig-
more pointed out in commenting on this case, a judicial device was
available to permit the necessary comparison without requiring the soft
drink maker to disclose on the public record the secret of its success.'
Coca-Cola could have requested, and the court could have ordered, pro-
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cedures in camera." The valuable formula would have been shielded
from public view while still permitting the company to prove its case.
Fortunately, the result of the Coca-Cola case is not invariable. Gen-
erally, counsel are alert to the possibilities afforded by in camera pro-
ceedings and courts are not loath to conceal trade secrets from public
view when the interests of justice dictate.5 It has become generally
recognized that the use of in camera procedures is essential in civil liti-
gation if litigants with important secrets to safeguard are not to be
placed beyond the protection of the law.6
But when similar attempts are made to obtain confidential treat-
ment in the context of federal and state administrative or legislative
proceedings, the matter becomes more complex. While civil litigation
usually concerns only the just resolution of a private dispute, adminis-
trative and legislative proceedings may involve a significant additional
factor: an intensified public interest in the disclosure of all that tran-
spires.7 Since many businessmen are intimately involved with adminis-
trative agencies, any difficulty in obtaining confidential treatment can
pose a serious problem.
The difficulties confronting the businessman desiring confidentiality
for matters he deems essential to be kept secret were highlighted by
the case of FCC v. Schreiber.8 In the course of a public investigation
of television network programming, the Federal Communications Com-
mission subpoenaed Taft B. Schreiber, an officer of Music Corporation
of America (MCA), to appear and testify concerning his company's
role in producing, packaging, and owning television network programs.
The subpoena requested a list of all programs appearing on the three
4 "Let the court hear in camera the testimony showing the ingredients' proportions, let
these details not be mentioned in the opinion, and let the judge's note of them be preserved
for confidential transmission to the court of appeal." Id. at 565-66.
5 See, e.g., State ex rel. Ampco Metal, Inc. v. O'Neill, 273 Wis. 530, 78 N.W.2d 921
(1956). See also Masland v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours Powder Co., 224 F. 689 (3d Cir.
1915), rev'd on other grounds, 244 U.S. 100 (1917); National Starch Prods., Inc. v. Polymer
Indus., Inc., 273 App. Div. 732, 739, 79 N.Y.S.2d 357, 363-64 (1948).
6 See, e.g., Taylor Iron & Steel Co. v. Nichols, 73 N.J. Eq. 684, 690, 69 A. 186, 188
(1908); cf. Marshwood Co. v. Jamie Mills, Inc., 10 F.R.D. 386 (N.D. Ohio 1950) (in camera
protection granted pursuant to FED. R. Crv. P. 30(b)). See also A.O. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum
Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531, 539 n.1 (1934), modified on other grounds, 74 F.2d 934 (6th
Cir. 1935); Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp. v. Cox, 50 N.Y.S.2d 643 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
7 See Graber Mfg. Co. v. Dixon, 223 F. Supp. 1020, 1021 (D.D.C. 1963); Rourke, Law
Enforcement Through Publicity, 24 U. CR. L. REV. 225, 231 (1957); Note, The Distinction
Between Informing and Prosecutorial Investigations: A Functional Justification for "Star
Chamber" Proceedings, 72 YALE L.J. 1227, 1236 (1963). Such disclosure also has effective
use as a coercive device. Rourke, supra at 232. But abuse can easily result if the administra-
tive agency becomes too conscious of its own public relations or too careless regarding the
impact on the reputation of the party being investigated. Id.; 72 YALE L.J. at 1237.
8381 U.S. 279 (1965).
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major networks in which MCA packaged or had a percentage interest.
Schreiber agreed to testify concerning these matters and to produce the
list only if the Commission would accept this information in confidence.
It was the corporation's position that the information sought might dis-
dose trade secrets which would cause it grave injury. The hearing ex-
aminer denied the claim and the Commission upheld him. In its opin-
ion the Commission stated its resolve to permit in camera acceptance of
evidence only in the extraordinary situation where (1) public disclosure
would irreparably damage the private business interest and (2) the pri-
vate business interest could be said to outweigh the public interest in
full disclosure.
However, when the Commission sought to enforce the subpoena,
the district court qualified enforcement by ordering that all evidence
received by the Commission be taken and held in confidence unless and
until the Commission could show good cause for the public release
of the evidence."° A divided Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
action in this regard, holding that the district court had not abused its
discretion in conditioning the enforcement order.'1
In reversing the court of appeals, the Supreme Court 2 agreed with
the dissenting view taken by Circuit Judge Browning.3 Chief Justice
Warren, writing for a unanimous Court, reasoned that, as a result of
congressional delegation, 4 it is the Commission which has the discretion
to accord or deny in camera treatment of evidence and all subsequent
judicial review is limited to determining whether the Commission's ex-
ercise of that discretion was reasonable. 5 The Court was of the opin-
ion that it was well within the Commission's authority to place the
burden of justifying confidential treatment of evidence on MCA as the
moving party.'"
By ordering enforcement of the administrative subpoena without
qualification,' 7 the Court must have viewed the record made before the
Commission as providing no basis for confidential treatment regardless
of the standard of proof laid down by the administrative agency. 8 Thus,
0 Id. at 285.
1ld. at 287.
1 F:CC v. Schreiber, 329 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1964).
12See 381 U.S. at 288.
13 329 F.2d at 528 (Browning, J., dissenting).
14 Communications Act of 1934, § 4(j), 48 Stat. 1068, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 154(j)
(1964) provides in part: "The Commission may conduct its proceedings in such manner as
will best conduce to the proper dispatch of business and to the ends of justice."
25 See 381 U.S. at 291.
'1 Id. at 294.
'7Id. at 300.
18If it had found any basis for confidential treatment, the Court would necessarily have
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the Court never questioned the standard imposed by the Commission.
All that the Court said in this regard was that MCA had not presented
any evidence from which the hearing examiner could "ascertain the
likelihood of irreparable damage to private competitive interests, nor
could he discern whether the private interest outweighed the public in-
terest in disclosure."'" If and when information was demanded which
might in fact injure MCA competitively, the Court noted that there
would be ample opportunity to request that it be received in confidence
and to seek judicial protection if the request was denied."
This view raises a serious question for the businessman or anyone
else seeking confidential treatment from an administrative agency. How
is the private party to meet the agency's standard of proof, whatever
that standard may be, without disclosing in the process that which he
wishes to conceal from public view? Unless the agency provides some
limited preliminary in camera procedure for the showing of need for
confidentiality, the subpoenaed party may be placed on the horns of a
dilemma: either make a showing which reveals in whole or part that
which he wishes to conceal from public view or reveal his business or
*trade secret directly. Confronted with this Hobson's choice, he may
wish to stand mute. If he does, the district court will be unable to aid
him even in the instance where he has a legitimate claim to in camera
treatment, for the district court can hardly deem an agency's denial of
confidentiality an abuse of discretion when there has been no showing
of need before the agency.
This practical problem is just one of several confronting the busi-
nessman in this developing area of administrative law. This article will
attempt to explore some of these problems in the hope of indicating an
approach to their solution that will provide protection for legitimate
claims to confidentiality while permitting maximum public disclosure of
information. Situations will arise, of course, in which both interests
cannot be served. But even in these instances, counsel should be fa-
miliar with the problems and how they may best be approached before
the major federal administrative agencies.
WHAT INFORMATION MAY BE ACCORDED
CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT
Any examination of the area of confidential treatment must first
determine what asserted secrets should even be considered for protection
ordered the district court to consider whether the Commission had exceeded its discretion in
establishing such a standard.




from disclosure. There is no disagreement that a secret formula or
process which is the essence of a company's success deserves protection
from unnecessary disclosure.21 Courts appear hopelessly split, however,
as to whether customer lists, advertising budgets, cost figures, sales fig-
ures, and other similar types of information are eligible for protection.2"
According to the Restatement of Torts, "a trade secret may consist of
any formula, pattern, device, or compilation of information which is
used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an
advantage over competitors who do not know or use it."2  Thus, a
trade secret may range from a chemical compound24 to a pricing code. "
Almost any information possessed by one person or a restricted group
in a form not generally available can be considered a trade secret.2"
Such information, however, may not always be protected.27
The dilemma facing the businessman seeking trade secret status
can best be seen in the courts' treatment of customer lists. Rather than
ascertaining the status of this information in the general industry or its
importance to the operation of the particular firm, the courts have re-
lied instead on arbitrary standards. As a result, different courts and
commentators -have urged protection of all lists,2" written lists,2 9 or only
retail route lists.30 This uncertain status of the trade secret explains the
21 See notes 5 & 6 supra and accompanying text.
22 Under New York law, for instance, customer information may be a trade secret. Hey-
man v. AR. Winarick, Inc., 325 F.2d 584, 590-91 (2d Cir. 1963). But under Texas law a
customer list is not normally considered a trade secret. Texas Shop Towel, Inc. v. Haire, 246
S.W.2d 482, 485 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952). The Federal Trade Commission has distinguished
between "trade secrets," i.e., secret formulas and processes, which it considers worthy of pro-
tection, and "business secrets;' e.g., gross sales and cost figures, which it considers much less
worthy. H.P. Hood & Sons, 58 F.T.C. 1184, 1188-89 (1961). But see Norwegian Nitrogen
Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 324 (1933) (Tariff Commission interpreted "trade
secrets and processes" to include cost data).
2 3 RESTATMENT o TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 757, comment b at 3 (1939).
24 Belmont Labs., Inc. v. Heist, 300 Pa. 542, 550-51, 151 A. 15, 18 (1930), modified on
other grounds, 303 Pa. 7, 154 A. 19 (1931).
2 5 
ee Simmons Hardware Co. v. Waibel, 1 S.D. 488, 494-95, 47 N.W. 814, 816 (1891).
2 6 See, e.g., Heyman v. AR. Winarick, Inc., 325 F.2d 584, 590-91 (2d Cir. 1963); Co-
lonial Laundries, Inc. v. Henry, 48 ILI 332, 138 A. 47 (1927). See generally RESTATE-
MENT OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 757, comment b at 3 (1939).
2 7 See, e.g., Clark Paper Co. v. Stenacher, 236 N.Y. 312, 140 N.E. 708 (1923); Kansas
City Laundry Serv. Co. v. Jeserich, 213 Mo. App. 71, 247 S.W. 447 (1923); Goldberg v.
Goldberg, 205 App. Div. 435, 200 N.Y.S. 3, modified on other grounds, 206 App. Div. 769,
200 N.Y.S. 925 (1923).
28 5 S. WILLISTON & G. THOMPSON, CONTRACTS § 1646 (rev. ed. 1937).
29 Grand Union Tea Co. v. Dodds, 164 Mich. 50, 128 N.W. 1090 (1910); see Federal
Laundry Co. v. Zimmerman, 218 Mich. 211, 187 N.W. 335 (1922); RESTATEMENT OF
AGENCy 2d § 396(b) (1958).
0 Mackechnie Bread Co. v. Huber, 60 Cal. App. 539, 213 P. 285 (1923); see Colonial
Laundries, Inc. v. Henry, 48 R1. 332, 338-39, 138 A. 47, 49-50 (1927); Kansas City Laundry
Serv. Co. v. Jeserich, 213 Mo. App. 71, 79-80, 247 S.W. 447,450 (1923).
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reluctance of business firms to subject their basic formulae and modes
of operation to the whim of the courts.
The authors believe, however, that efforts to classify business infor-
mation and then base confidential treatment on that classification is ill-
advised; it begs the important question of the impact of the individual
disclosure on the particular business. A pragmatic approach ought to
be required of the agency's hearing examiners. No claim for confiden-
tial treatment of business information should be rejected unless the exami-
ner has first provided to the proponent of confidentiality an opportunity to
demonstrate the nature and degree of the damage which would result from
disclosure.31 Any administrative imposition of a priori limitations on the
type of business information which will be accorded protection would be
ill-advised and might well amount to an abuse of discretion.
PROCEEDINGS IN WHICH THE REQUEST FOR
CONFIDENTIALITY SHOULD BE MADE
Absent express statutory limitations, there is no doubt that an agency
has the power to determine whether a particular proceeding is to be
public or private, or partially both.3 This power includes the authority
31 The Federal Trade Commission gave such an opportunity in Graber Mfg. Co. v. Dixon
by means of a preliminary in camera hearing. 223 F. Supp. 1020 (D.D.C. 1963). Following
the temporary in camera proceedings, however, the hearing examiner, relying on the Com-
mission's opinion in H.P. Hood & Sons, 58 F.T.C. 1184 (1961), denied Graber's request for
permanent confidential treatment, and the Commission refused to entertain an interlocutory
appeaL The district court held, inter alia, that Graber had demonstrated that a clearly de-
fined and serious injury to its business could result from public disclosure of the exhibit and
that, accordingly, the denial of permanent in camera status to the exhibit in question was an
abuse of the Commission's discretion. 223 F. Supp. at 1023. Unfortunately, the district
court abandoned its pragmatism by ordering that other exhibits be held confidential even
though no showing to warrant such treatment was ever made to the hearing examiner. Id.
In this respect Graber has been implicitly overruled by FCC v. Schreiber. See notes 16-20
supra and accompanying text. For an excellent study of the FTC's treatment of confidential in-
formation at the hearing stage, see Gellhorn, The Treatment of Confidential Information by the
Federal Trade Commission: The Hearing, 116 U. PA. L. REV, 401 (1968).
A preliminary procedure similar to that used in Graber was attempted in Will Weiss
where the Secretary of the Army was denied the right to withhold documents under an execu-
tive privilege. 155 Ct. Cl. 825 (1961). The Commissioner requested the Government to
list and describe the withheld documents to see if the claim of privilege could be determined
without their production or examination. The Government refused to surrender all the
documents in spite of the Commissioner's offer to return them upon an adverse finding,
thereby preserving confidentiality. In light of the protections offered, the refusal was deemed
bad faith and the Government was then ordered either to turn the documents over to the
plaintiff for discovery purposes or to deliver them to the Commissioner for his determination
as to the allowance or rejection of the claim of privilege. Id. at 899; see Evans, Current Pro-
cedures in the Court of Claims, 55 GEo. .J. 422, 433-34 (1966).
32 Federal agencies typically have broad power to determine their own proceedings. The
Federal Communications Commission, for example, has been empowered to "conduct its pro-
ceedings in such manner as will best conduce to the proper dispatch of business and to the
ends of justice." 47 U.S.C. § 154(j) (1964); see 47 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1965). The Supreme
Court has held that such a provision confers power upon the agency to establish its own pro-
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to establish standards for a ruling by a hearing examiner permitting a
party to obtain in camera status for certain testimony or other evidence,"
and under such a standard the hearing examiner may commit the agency
to a pledge of confidential treatment. While it is obvious that the busi-
nessman should always seek in camera treatment of business secrets in
a public proceeding, there will be times when the request should be
made in a closed proceeding as well. 4 The mere fact that a proceed-
ing, particularly an investigatory one, is nonpublic does not necessarily
mean that information presented therein may not subsequently be dis-
closed. " Unless the private party seeks a commitment not to make the
information available to the public, the agency is generally free to pub-
lish the information or place it in the public record of a subsequent
related adjudicatory proceeding.
A party to such a subsequent adjudicatory proceeding would, at that
time, have the absolute right to request that the material furnished 'by
it in a prior nonpublic investigation be continued in an in camera status.
A nonparty to the subsequent proceeding would have to seek leave from
the agency to intervene in the proceeding before any such request for
confidentiality could be made, and the obtaining of such leave is no
certainty."0 It is essential for the protection of his client, therefore, that
counsel make formal request for permanent confidential treatment in
the nonpublic proceeding itself.
But even a commitment of confidentiality is not absolute protection
against disclosure. While it is true that Congress has made it a crime
for a government officer or employee to divulge "any information" com-
cedural rules both generally and for specific purposes. FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 289
(1965); see Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 321-22 (1933).
33 FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 292 (1965); Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United
States, 288 U.S. 294, 321-22 (1933).
34 Most agency investigatory proceedings are of this type. See, e.g., 30 C.FR. § 222.24
(Department of Interior); 16 C.F.R. § 1.41 (Federal Trade Commission); 17 C.F.R. § 203.5
(Securities & Exchange Commission); 46 C.F.R. § 502.291 (Federal Maritime Commission).
See also Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 321-22 (1933); 5
U.S.C. § 555(c) (Supp. II, 1965-1966).
35 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 154(l) (1964). While a Federal Trade Commission investiga-
tion may be nonpublic, the Commission has the authority to order public disclosure of all
information obtained by it in the investigation except trade secrets and customer lists. 15
U.S.C. § 46(f) (1964); see 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.133-34 (1967). All such information, without
exception, may be utilized in a related public adjudicatory proceeding. Id.; see FTC v. Tuttle,
244 F.2d 605, 616 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 925 (1958); cf. 8 J. WIGMORE,
EvmENcE § 2212(3) (McNaughton ed. 1961).
36 It has been indicated to the authors that the practice of the Federal Trade Commission,
at least, is to permit third parties who have furnished confidential business information in a
closed investigation (whether voluntary or under the Act) to appear at subsequent public
adjudicatory proceedings and request confidentiality for the material furnished by them. In-
terview with Assistant General Counsel Fletcher Cohn, in Washington, D.C., Jan. 27, 1967;
see 15 U.S.C. § 46(f) (1964).
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ing to him in his capacity as an officer or employee relating to "trade
secrets, processes, o erations, style of work, or apparatus, ..." the stat-
ute contains the large loophole permitting such disclosures where "au-
thorized by law."37  Thus, trade secrets or similar information received
in confidence could be disclosed in a later public proceeding88 or to Con-
gress89 without the federal officer or employee having to fear criminal
prosecution. °
Judicial injunctive protection is a theoretical possibility. Such an
instrument could only be used where the person desiring court protec-
tion knew of a threatened disclosure prior to its being made. Where
disclosure is to be made in a report to or by Congress or in a subsequent
agency proceeding to which the person was not a party, such knowledge
would be dearly fortuitous.41  As a practical matter, therefore, the
normal lack of foreknowledge precludes effective use of the judicial
injunction. Nevertheless, the existence of these problems should never
deter counsel from requesting confidential treatment whenever it would
be in his client's best interests not to have the information disclosed to
the general public. The agreement to hold information nonpublic may
and probably will operate as a moral restraint on the government em-
ployee or agency otherwise tempted to publicly disclose. Government
officers are generally honorable men and it is fair to presume that a
prior agreement to keep information in confidence will be honored
except in the most compelling situation. Furthermore, the failure to
have requested confidential status when the information was given in
37 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1964). But see 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-44, 80b-10(a), (b) (1964).
38 15 U.S.C. § 80b-10(b)(1) (1964).
39 E.g., id. §§ 80a-45 (a), 80b-10(b) (2).
4041 Op. ATr'Y GEN. 221 (1955). In the Schreiber case the Supreme Court specifically
noted that the Commission, in denying confidential treatment, relied in part upon its duty to
make annual reports to Congress. 381 U.S. at 294, citing 47 U.S.C. § 154(k) (1964). The
Court also noted that funds were authorized by Congress for the specific investigation that
formed the basis of the Schreiber case because of the congressional desire to "draw upon the
facts which are obtained" by the Commission. 381 U.S. at 294, citing 101 CoNG. REC. 7629
(1955).
41 Relief in tort appears to be unlikely since the federal government is immune from
such liability. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1964). Similarly, a broad immunity doctrine protects
the government officer or employee from any fear of tort liability. Howard v. Lyons, 360
U.S. 593 (1959); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); see Norton v. McShain, 332 F.2d
855 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 981 (1965); Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1949). Contra, Kelley v. Dunne, 344 F.2d 129 (1st
Cir. 1965); Hughes v. Johnson, 305 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1962). It should be noted that Barr
was decided by a 5-4 vote and that the Government did not seek certiorari in either of the
circuit cases that went against it on this point. Any implication that the denial of certiorari
in Norton might constitute a ratification of Barr is weakened by the civil rights overtones
in the Norton case. Whatever may occur on further Supreme Court review of the question,
the fact remains that the broad immunity doctrine of Barr is now the law.
[Vol. 56: 451
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a nonpublic proceeding could be treated as a waiver of any right to such
treatment should the agency later seek to disclose.
PRERULING PROTECTION FOR ALLEGED BUSINESS SECRETS
A proponent of confidentiality is initially faced with the problem
of maintaining the secrecy of his information while he tries to demon-
strate a need for in camera treatment. A "naked assertion" avails him
little,4 2 and any submission of the information exposes it to possible
public disclosure. Moreover, a refusal to submit the information, as
demonstrated by Schreiber, will not sustain an appeal. The reason for
this confusing state of affairs is the almost total absence of any preruling
protection for a party seeking in camera treatment. Only two agencies,
the Civil Aeronautics Board43 and the Securities and Exchange Commis-
42 381 U.S. at 298-99. The validity of the FCC's procedures concerning the establish-
ment of a case for confidentiality was not at issue in Schreiber. In the status in which that
case reached the Supreme Court, the only question was whether the Commission could place
the burden on the witness to establish a proper case for in camera proceedings and whether
Schreiber's mere demand for such proceedings and naked assertions of injury satisfied that
burden.
43 CAB Rules & Regs., 14 C.F.R. § 302.39 (1967). Specific authority for the CAB's
regulation is found in § 1104 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1504 (1964),
which provides:
Any person may make written objection to the public disclosure of information con-
tained in any application, report, or document filed pursuant to the provisions of this
chapter or of information obtained by the Board or the Administrator, pursuant to
the provisions of this chapter, stating the grounds for such objection. Whenever such
objection is made, the Board or Administrator shall order such information withheld
from public disclosure when, in their judgment, the disclosure of such information
would adversely affect the interests of such person and is not required in the interest
of the public. The Board or Administrator shall be responsible for classified in-
formation in accordance with appropriate law: Provided, That nothing in this Sec-
tion shall authorize the withholding of information by the Board or Administrator
from the duly authorized committees of the Congress.
Under the CAB's regulations, any person who objects to the public disclosure of information
contained in documents filed with the Board or included within any testimony is entitled to
have the relevant information taken in camera and then placed in a sealed envelope bearing
the notation "Classified or Confidential Treatment Requested Under 5 302.39." The ob-
jecting party is then given five days to file a formal motion requesting confidentiality and
including a statement describing the material and demonstrating the need for confidentiality.
14 C.F.R. § 302.39(a) (1967). While the regulation does not require the motion itself to
be taken in camera, the practice of the Board is to extend confidential treatment to the motion,
upon the request of counsel. If the Board denies the motion, the moving party is given five
days from the date of entry of the Board's adverse order to file a written statement with the
Board indicating the moving party's good faith intention to seek judicial review of the Board's
order. 14 C.F.R. § 302.39(e) (1967). The Board is generally very lenient in granting
requests for confidentiality, and once a request is granted, the Board will go to great lengths
to protect business secrets. The Board may order such a degree of confidentiality that only
enforcement counsel may see the material. Or the Board may require the coding of customer
or travel agent lists so that while financial and economic data of a carrier is placed on the
record, no one but the cryptographer will know the precise sources of a carrier's operating
revenue. In addition, when confidential material is included in the record, the hearing ex-
aminer may be required to prepare both a public initial decision and a private or confidential
decision. Telephone conversation with Francis W. Brown, CAB Chief Hearing Examiner,
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sion,44 provide any rules guaranteeing the secrecy of information dur-
ing the agency's deliberations on whether to accord permanent confi-
dential status4 Since the -burden of sustaining such a request is clearly
on the businessman,46 protection for him in the form of a preliminary
in camera procedure ought to prevent publication of disclosures made
when the required showing is attempted.
Such a procedure has much to recommend it. First of all, the agency
will get possession of the information and the hearing will be able to
proceed while the issue of confidentiality is being resolved. 7 One need
only examine the results of the Schreiber case to realize the value of
this; MCA, by withholding information deemed crucial by the FCC,
managed to delay the hearing's progress for almost 5 years!48  This is
not to say that providing such protection will assure willing submission
of evidence, but it will certainly substantially diminish both the fre-
quency and success of refusals to obey agency subpoenas.49
Admittedly, this preruling protection creates certain difficulties.
Most important is the frustration, though temporary, of the overriding
agency concern with full public disclosure. On closer examination, this
Apr. 4, 1967. The filing of this statement precludes public disclosure of the relevant infor-
mation until completion of judicial review. 14 C.F.R. 5 302.39(e) (1967).
44 SEC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.26(b)(1) (1967). The SEC's rules are the most
explicit in this regard:
All papers containing data as to which confidential treatment is sought, together
with any application making objection to the disclosure thereof, or other papers re-
lating in any way to such application, shall be made available to the public only in
accordance with orders of the Commission and/or the applicable provisions . . . of
this chapter ....Id.
45 At least two other agencies claim, as a matter of practice, to follow preliminary in
camera procedures similar to those of the Civil Aeronautics Board in adjudicatory proceedings.
Interview with members of FTC Staff, in Washington, D.C., Jan. 27, 1967; Memorandum
from FCC General Counsel Henry Geller to the authors, Dec. 6, 1966; Interview with FCC
General Counsel, Henry Geller in Washington, D.C., Nov. 3, 1966; see Graber Mfg. Co.
v. Dixon, 223 F. Supp. 1020, 1021 (D.D.C. 1963). This informal manner of approaching
the problem is quite unsatisfactory since it permits wide variations in practice, depending
upon the identity of the hearing examiner. Of course, this objection can be obviated by pro-
viding hearing examiners with a manual of practice similar to that published by the CAB.
46381 U.S. at 299; Graber Mfg. Co. v. Dixon, 223 F. Supp. 1020, 1022 (D.D.C. 1963);
H.P. Hood & Sons, 58 F.T.C. 1184, 1188 (1961).
4 7 In the Schreiber case, MCA was the largest member of the industry under study and a
failure to obtain information from it successfully rendered all other data meaningless. 381
U.S. at 283.
48 Id. at 297.
49 Under a preruling protection arrangement, there could be little justification for non-
production and the "naked assertions" doctrine of Schreiber would bar any successful refusals.
Id. at 298-99. The validity of the FCC procedure concerning the establishment of need
for confidentiality was not at issue in Schreiber. When that case reached the Supreme Court,
the only issue was whether the Commission could place the burden of establishing need for
in camera proceedings on the wimess and whether Schreiber's mere demand for such pro-
ceedings satisfied that burden.
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objection loses -much of its force. Public disclosure usually occurs at
the conclusion of a proceeding when the entire hearing becomes a pub-
lic record. Almost any issue of permanent confidential status will be
settled before the hearing terminates. In those instances where the
issue of confidentiality survives the hearing, due to judicial review, de-
lay of public disclosure, as is demonstrated -by Schreiber, will be no dif-
ferent than under existing law.
Nor will such a preruling protection affect the 'burden of proof in
the determination of in camera status. While it is true that the infor-
mation will be temporarily retained in camera, the proponent will still
have to demonstrate satisfactorily the need for preserving that status.
Since application of the protection would be automatic, it would in no
way reflect on the merits of any individual request.
Perhaps the most compelling argument for preruling protection is
the effect of the alternatives which might be employed by a businessman
in its absence. If safeguards are not afforded by the agency, the busi-
nessman with a substantial claim to confidential treatment may wish
to pursue one of two courses, depending upon whether the agency is in
possession of the information sought to be protected. If the agency is
not in possession of the information, upon the advice of counsel, the
businessman may wish to appear before the agency and respectfully de-
dine to testify or produce the necessary papers." This will require the
agency to seek enforcement of its subpoenas ad testificarduam and duces
tecum in the district court, at which time the allegedly inadequate
agency procedural safeguards against disclosure may be challenged by
way of defense to the enforcement action. If, on the other hand, the
agency is already in possession of the information, the businessman will
be obliged, if judicial review is available,"' to bring an action for injunc-
tive relief to prevent the agency from making disclosure prior to the
final determination of the request for confidentiality.
Neither of these alternatives is satisfactory. The first denies the
material to the agency and thereby delays the hearing for the length of
5 0 It now seems clear that a respectful refusal to obey an agency subpoena in good faith
will not subject the subpoenaed party to immediate criminal sanctions. See Reisman v. Cap-
ln, 375 U.S. 440, 447 (1964); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 359 F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1966).
Only after the judiciary has ruled adversely to the proponent of confidentiality and enforced
the subpoena would criminal sanctions be available to the Government to punish continued
refusal to obey the subpoenas. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, supra at 489. Of course, if
the district court were to find that the original claim to confidentiality was frivolous and the
refusal to obey the administrative subpoena not to have been in good faith, the criminal
sanctions of such statutes as Federal Trade Commission Act § 16 could be imposed for the
original disobedience of the agency's subpoenas. 15 U.S.C. § 50 (1964).
51 The problem of the availability and scope of judicial review of an agency's interlocutory
ruling denying confidential treatment is discussed infra, pp. 464-67.
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time necessary to obtain enforcement of the subpoena. The second
achieves the same result as preruling protection, 'but involves far more
delay: once the issue of injunctive relief is settled and the question of
temporary in camera status decided, additional judicial review might lie
on the question of permanent in camera status.5" In light of these pos-
sibilities, preruling protection would seem to be both logical and just.
THE STANDARD OF PROOF
Having received some degree of assurance that his asserted business
secrets will not be prematurely disclosed, the businessman must now
prove his case on the merits. His first impediment is the statement of
the standard of proof in very general terms: he must show that the
private interest in nondisclosure outweighs the public interest in full
disclosure of administrative proceedings."3 Any expression which con-
trasts private interests with public ones places the businessman at a de-
cided psychological disadvantage. It should, instead, be applied in terms
of weighing the public interest in protecting the businessman's enter-
prise from serious damage or destruction against the public interest in
fall disclosure.
Any expression of the standard, however, is too general to be of
much assistance in deciding specific cases. As the FTC has recognized,
"a definitive answer [as to what constitutes a showing of good cause for
confidential treatment] responsive to all factual situations cannot be
given and indeed none should be attempted since this is an area which
quite obviously falls peculiarly within the scope of the hearing exam-
iner's discretion."54
5 2 The idea of offering two points of judicial challenge to an in camera ruling is its own
best refutation. By making permanent status the only question for review, the continuity of
the hearing process is preserved while the only real objection to a denial of in camera treat-
ment, disclosure to others, is still susceptible to judicial evaluation.
53See, e.g., 381 U.S. at 299; Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 1104, 49 U.S.C. § 1504
(1964). See also E. Griffiths Hughes, Inc. v. FTC, 61 App. D.C. 386, 388, 63 F.2d 362, 364
(1933); H.P. Hood & Sons, 58 F.T.C. 1184 (1961).
54 H.P. Hood & Sons, 58 F.T.C. 1184, 1188 (1961). As far as the authors are aware,
Hood is the only reported case in -which any body, administrative or judicial, has attempted
to come to grips with the standard of proof necessary to justify confidentiality. While dis-
claiming any attempt to bind its heating examiners to a hard and fast rule covering every
case, the Commission stated that as a matter of general policy, "the correct rule requires a
showing that the public disclosure of the documentary evidence will result in a clearly de-
fined, serious injury to the person or corporation whose records are involved. The showing
may consist of extrinsic evidence or, in certain instances, may be inferred from the nature of
the documents themselves." Id. The last sentence has reference to the Commission's novel
distinction between "trade secrets," e.g., the secret formula for Coca-Cola, which may be
accorded confidential status simply because serious harm from disclosure is clearly inferable,
and "business secrets," e.g., cost data relative to the production of the same soft drink, the
disclosure of which does not necessarily require the inference of serious competitive harm.
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It is precisely this area of the hearing examiner's discretion which
provides the most flexible alternative to an uncompromising standard
of proof. By emphasizing this stage of the consideration for confiden-
tial treatment, agencies will be able to afford meaningful protection to
business secrets without surrendering their regulatory control over the
disposition of in camera treatment. The hearing examiner should not
only be able to entertain a broad spectrum of considerations, but should
also be able to assign varying weight to the evidence offered.
In exercising his discretion, there are several factors which the hear-
ing examiner should be permitted to consider. The first is the spe-
cific reasons, in the case before him, for public disclosure of the infor-
mation. Is disclosure necessary to draw supplemental information or
even refutation from other interested persons or businesses?55 Is dis-
closure desired to make the public aware of possible wrongdoing in
the sector of the economy and to allow the public to protect itself?5"
Is it desired to inform the public and interested members of the affected
industry of the reasons for the agency's promulgation of new rules or
regulations or its request to Congress for new legislation?5" Or is pub-
lic disclosure desired simply because it accords with the public policy of
a democratic society favoring such course? "
The first two reasons, responsive to needs rather than policies, are
clearly the most compelling. The requisite showing in such instances
The Commission looks with disfavor upon "requests to seal relevant evidence of this type"
and believes that such requests should only be granted "in exceptional circumstances upon a
clear showing the irreparable injury will result from disclosure." Id. at 1189.
The court in Graber criticized the Commission's standard as too stringent, but it failed
to set out clearly any standard of its own. Graber Mfg. Co. v. Dixon, 223 F. Supp. 1020,
1022-23 (D.D.C. 1963). It said only that "the plaintiff Graber has shown that a dearly
defined and serious injury to his business would result from public disclosure of the infor-
mation... and has therefore, shown 'good cause' for holding such information confidential"
Id. at 1023. The obvious shortcoming of the district court's approach is that it fails to con-
sider the factors underlying the public's interest in disclosure of the information involved.
55 This was a prime motivation in the FCC's decision to hold a public investigation of
network program procurement: "[ln order 'to obtain a full and rounded picture of such
transactions, it is highly desirable that the facts, information, data and opinion supplied by
one group or individual be known to other groups and individuals involved, so that they
may verify, refute, explain, amplify or supplement the record from their own diverse points
of view."' 381 U.S. at 294.
5GThis is the primary consideration in the SEC's decision whether to keep information
obtained in its adjudicatory proceedings confidential Interview with David Ferber, Solid-
tor of the SEC, in Washington, D.C., Dec. 8, 1966.
57See Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 33-35, Schreiber v. FCC, 381 U.S. 279 (1965).
58 It is "the fundamental policy of free societies that justice is usually promoted by dis-
closure rather than secrecy." Boeing Airplane Co. v. Coggeshall, 108 U.S. App. D.C. 106,
114, 280 F.2d 654, 662 (1960). The most recent statutory expression of this policy is the
so-called "Freedom of Information Act." Administrative Procedure Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. §
552 (1967). See generally Note, Freedom of Information: The Statute and the Regulations,
56 GEO. L.J. 18 (1967).
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should therefore be greater than that necessary to overcome a general
policy favoring disclosure. The authority to determine the exact quan-
tum of showing in a particular case should rest with the hearing exami-
ner. This is the only way to achieve a workable balancing process.
Another factor is the nature of the information itself. Is it really
secret?"9 If so, is it merely internal financial or economic information
or is it a customer list, a secret formula, or a new process which has
given the businessman a strong competitive advantage? A hearing ex-
aminer would probably require a stronger showing of need for confi-
dentiality when the information involves simply internal financial or
economic data, since the need for protecting this type of information is
much less dear.6"
Finally, the hearing examiner must consider both the likelihood of
harm to the businessman and the precise nature and severity of that
harm. It will be necessary for counsel to demonstrate that the harm
is certain to result and readily ascertainable. In addition, he must dem-
onstrate that the harm to his client's business will be substantial. While
no quantitative standard would completely serve here, evidence that dis-
closure will cause the loss of one important customer while ninety-nine
others remain will certainly not suffice. On the other hand, should
disclosure cause the loss of the one customer who is essential to the
continuance of the business, more serious consideration should be given
to the businessman's request for confidentiality.
The examiner's decision to grant or deny confidential treatment re-
quires a balancing of interests. Although a business may be severely
damaged or even destroyed because of public disclosure, the public in-
terest in the information may be so compelling as to require just that
result. The authors doubt, however, that a business should be sacrificed
simply to vindicate the general public policy favoring disclosure of the
reasons underlying new agency rules, regulations, or requests for addi-
tional legislation.
AVAILABILITY AND SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE DENIAL OF CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT
Should counsel for the businessman be unable to persuade the hear-
5 9 A suspicion exists that the "confidential" list of MCA-packaged network television pro-
grams which was at the heart of the Schreiber litigation was not secret since Fortuno maga-
zine published a chart purporting to show the prime time network programs for the week
of April 3-9, 1960, with which MCA was associated. FORTUNE, July 1960, at 116-17. More-
over, MCA's competitors furnished the same type of information without objection. 381
U.S. at 298. If the businessman does not guard his assertedly confidential information, there
is no reason why the administrative agencies should.
6 0 See H.P. Hood & Sons, 58 F.T.C. 1184, 1188-89 (1961).
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ing examiner and the agency that his client's asserted business secrets
should be received in camera, he must then decide whether judicial
review of the adverse ruling is appropriate. Before determining whether
to indulge in costly litigation, counsel must consider whether judicial
review of the interlocutory decision is available and, if it is, whether the
scope of that review is broad enough to permit a meaningful challenge
of the adverse ruling.
If the information is still solely within the knowledge of his client,
judicial review may be obtained by alleging incorrect denial of confi-
dential treatment as a defense to judicial enforcement of the agency's
subpoena. 1 It is less dear, however, whether judicial review would be
available to the businessman in an action against the agency for injunc-
tive and declaratory relief, where the agency has not affirmatively sought
judicial enforcement.
Congress has provided a general scheme for exclusive judicial review
of agency actions by a court of appeals subsequent to the entry of final
administrative orders." Pursuant to such statutory review, the court of ap-
peals may consider all constitutional, jurisdictional, substantive, and pro-
cedural questions arising out of the agency's proceedings. 3 In light of these
circumstances, federal district courts have usually been obliged to dismiss
equitable actions challenging interlocutory administrative actions because
of the failure of the complainant to first exhaust his statutory remedy."
Recently, in those cases where the statutory remedy has been plainly
inadequate to prevent irreparable injury,65 the federal courts have carved
out an exception to the requirement that the statutory remedy must be
exhausted before judicial review will be granted. While none of these
cases presents a factual situation involving threatened disclosure of con-
fidential business information, it would appear that district court juris-
diction exists to entertain actions for injunctive and declaratory relief
challenging agency interlocutory orders which deny confidential status
61 Cf. 381 U.S. at 297-98.
62 E .g., Federal Trade Commission Act §§ 5(c), (d), 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(c), (d) (1964);
Securities and Exchange Act § 25, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (y) (1964); Federal Communications Act
of 1934 §§ 402(a), (b), 47 U.S.C. §§ 402(a), (b) (1964).
63 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 47 (1937); Administrative
Procedure Act § 10(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (Supp. II, 1965-1966).
64 See, e.g., Allen v. Grand Cent Aircraft Co., 347 U.S. 535, 553 (1954); Myers v. Beth-
lehem Shipbldg. Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 47-52 (1938); Bokat v. Tidewater Equip. Co., 363 F.2d
667, 671-72 (5th Cir. 1966).
O5 See McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional, 372 U.S. 10, 16-17 (1963); Leedom v. Kyne, 358
U.S. 184, 188-89 (1958). See also Wolf Corp. v. SEC, 317 F.2d 139, 143, 115 U.S. App.
D.C. 75, 79 (1963); Amos Treat & Co. v. SEC, 113 U.S. App. D.C. 100, 107, 306 F.2d 260,
267 (1962); Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston, 295 F.2d 856, 867-68 (4th Cir. 1961); 3
K. DAvIS, ADMiNISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 20.05, at 86 (1958).
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to alleged business secrets.66 Any other conclusion would require a
party to wait until entry of the agency's final order before challenging
the interlocutory denial of confidentiality; and public disclosure, with
its irreparable results, will most likely occur prior to the statutory re-
view. This should certainly represent sufficiently compelling circum-
stances to warrant equitable jurisdiction in the district court. 7
The traditional bar to such an appeal, failure to exhaust adminis-
trative remedies, should not pose an insurmountable hurdle. In sim-
ilar cases,6" courts have recognized the unalterable injury of delayed re-
view, and have granted jurisdiction where the agency's action might
cause "great and obvious damage."6  If it is remembered that such in-
jurious finality in the context of business secrets occurs when the infor-
mation is revealed, then an appeal should lie immediately upon a refusal
of confidentiality.
Once in court, the businessman's opportunity to obtain injunctive
and declaratory relief is further limited by the narrow scope of judicial
review defined by the Supreme Court in Schreiber. There review was
limited to determining whether, in denying confidentiality, the hearing
examiner or the agency had abused its discretion:"0
Remaining for determination is whether the Commission's applica-
tion of its disclosure rule and the consequent rejection of respondents'
"
6 See, e.g., Utah Fuel Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Comm'n, 306 U.S. 56 (1939).
In that case the fuel company sought an injunction forbidding disclosure of a detailed report
showing for each mine the cost of tonnage produced and the realization prices derived from'
sale during 1936. The Supreme Court, while holding that the district court properly dis-
missed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, took exception to the court of ap-
peals' view that the district court lacked jurisdiction: "Considering the circumstances here
alleged, the great and obvious damage which might be suffered, the importance of the rights
asserted, and the lack of any other remedy, we think complainants could properly ask relief
in equity." Id. at 60. See also the G-raber case in which the district court issued an injunc-
tion prohibiting disclosure of certain business secrets but failed to comment on the question
of its jurisdiction. Graber Mfg. Co. v. Dixon, 223 F. Supp. 1020 (D.D.C. 1963).
67 Cf. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-47 (1949). A few re-
cent decisions involving court proceedings have recognized the futility of judicial review
once trade or business secrets are divulged. See Chemical & Indus. Corp. v. Druffel, 301
F.2d 126, 129 (6th Cir. 1962); Hartley Pen Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 287 F.2d 324, 330
(9th Cir. 1961) (writ of mandamus issued to prevent disclosure of a secret formula); State
ex rel. Ampco Metal, Inc. v. O'Neill, 273 Wis. 530, 540, 78 N.W.2d 921, 927 (1956)
(same).68 See Utah Fuel Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Comm'n, 306 U.S. 56 (1939); cf.
Robertson v. Chambers, 341 U.S. 37 (1951); American Sumatra Tobacco Corp. v. SEC, 68
App. D.C. 77, 93 F.2d 236 (1937). But cf. Mallory Coal Co. v. National Bituminous Coal
Comm'n, 69 App. D.C. 166, 174, 99 F.2d 399, 406 (1938).69Utah Fuel Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Comm'n, 306 U.S. 56, 60 (1939).
7
oSee notes 13-20 supra and accompanying text. Accord, Norwegian Nitrogen Prods.
Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 321-22 (1933); American Sumatra Tobacco Corp. v. SEC,
71 App. D.C. 259, 262, 110 F.2d 117, 120 (1940); E. Griffiths Hughes, Inc. v. FTC, 61
App. D.C. 386, 388, 63 F.2d 362, 364 (1933); see M. FORKoscH, AimnisTArTivn LAW
§ 211, at 313 (1956).
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requests for confidential treatment were so arbitrary or unreasonable as
to warrant the imposition by the District Court of conditions upon en-
forcement of the Commission's subpoena and orders 71
Thus, unless an agency's refusal to grant confidential treatment is shown to
be plainly unreasonable, the district court is obliged to uphold the ruling
and to refrain from substituting its own judgment for that of the agency.
Delay and disruption of the administrative process may be occasioned
by counsel's resort to litigation.72  The Schreiber case is a good example
of the enormous time which can 'be consumed by appellate review.
Schreiber appeared before the hearing examiner on October 21, 1960.
71
By the time the Supreme Court upheld the FCC's order and remanded
to the district court for enforcement-May 24, 1965-the information
sought by the Commission was of so little relevance that the Commis-
sion made no attempt to enforce the subpoena. To obviate this prob-
lem, several agencies have established, or are considering, a system of
parallel public and private dockets to permit public proceedings to con-
tinue while the questions of confidentiality are litigated before the
agency or in the courts74 Under such a system, only in the relatively
rare case in which the agency is not in possession of the allegedly secret
information and the public proceedings cannot continue without the
agency's possession of such information will delay be possible.
THE EFFICACY OF OBTAINING ADMINISTRATIVE
CONFIDENTIALITY
Should an agency agree with the businessman that there is a legiti-
mate purpose in keeping his business secrets confidential, there is no
certainty that the information will remain shielded from public dis-
closure-some agency guarantees of confidentiality are far from abso-
lute. A pronounced example of this is the Federal Maritime Commis-
sion's new rule regarding confidentiality which contains the proviso that
"any information given pursuant thereto, may be used by the presiding offi-
cer or the Commission if they deem it necessary to a correct decision in the
proceeding."75 Obviously, the businessman subject to the jurisdiction of this
71 381 U.S. at 295.
72 See Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 323-24 (1933).
73 381 U.S. at 297.
74 Interview with Francis W. Brown, CAB Chief Hearing Examiner, in Washington,
D.C., Nov. 10, 1966; Interview with Henry Geller, FCC General Counsel, in Washington,
D.C., Nov. 3, 1966; Interview with members of the FTC Staff, in Washington, D.C., Jan. 27,
1967.
7 5 Federal Maritime Commission Rules of Practice & Procedure 10(aa), 46 C.F.R. § 502.
167 (1967). Another give-and-take-away agency regulation is the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Rules of Practice for Adjudicative Proceedings 3.16(g) which provides, inter alia: 'The
right of the hearing examiner, the Commission, and reviewing courts to disclose in camera
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agency can never be certain that his business secrets taken in camera will not
be taken out of camera under this somewhat illusory rule.7" Some agencies
reserve the right to order disclosure to interested federal or state agencies
and individuals or to the public upon a showing of good cause.77
Another potential loop-hole through which confidential information
may slip into the public domain is provided by the widespread statutory
requirement that the federal regulatory agencies make annual reports
to the Congress and its committees.78 That Congress 'may demand spe-
cial reports and information obtained by the agencies in confidence is
provided in Section 1104 of the Federal Aviation Act:7" "nothing in
this section shall authorize the withholding of information by the [Civil
Aeronautics) Board or [Federal Aviation Agency) Administrator from
the duly authorized committees of the Congress."8 The statute is silent
as to any responsibility on the part of congressional committees to re-
spect the confidentiality accorded 'by the Board or the Administrator."
Whenever a member of the air transportation industry receives a
grant of confidentiality for information provided the Board, it knows
that it is subject to the proviso of section 1104; hence, it can hardly be
heard to complain of congressional leaks. But there is more room for
data to the extent necessary for the proper disposition of the proceeding is specifically re-
served." 16 C.F.R. 5 3.16(g) (1967).
78For example, in one agency investigation certain stevedoring contracts were accorded
confidential treatment Trust & Lighter Loading & Unloading Practices at New York Har-
bor, FMC Doc. No. 1153. Nonetheless, provisions of these same contracts were discussed in
some detail in a later related report. See Supplemental Report to FMC Doc. No. 1153, Dec.
19, 1966.
7 7 See, e.g., FCC Reg. § 0A57, which reads in part:
MIThe Commission will entertain requests from members of the public.., for per-
mission to inspect particular records withheld from inspection under the provisions
of this section, and will weigh the policy considerations favoring non-disclosure
against the reasons cited for permitting inspection in the light of the facts of the par-
ticular case.
32 Fed. Reg. 10575 (1967). See also § 0.457(d)(1) of the same regulations which reads in
part:
Materials submitted to the Commission which contain trade secrets, or which con-
tain commercial, financial or technical data which would customarily be guarded from
competitors by the person submitting it, will not ordinarily be made available for
inspection. A persuasive showing as to the reasons for inspection of such materials
' .. will be required in requests for inspection ....
Id. at 10576.
7 8 E.g., Federal Trade Commission Act § 6(f), 15 U.S.C. 5 46(f) (1964); Federal Com-
munications Commission Act § 4(k), 47 U.S.C. § 154(k) (1964); Federal Aviation Act of
1958, § 205, 49 U.S.C. § 1325 (1964).
7049 U.S.C. § 1504 (1964).
8 0 The CAB's practice is to refuse disclosure of confidential information to individual
senators and congressmen by pointing to the precise language of the proviso: "authorized
committees of Congress." Telephone conversation with Joseph B. Goldman, CAB General
Counsel, in Washington, D.C., Nov. 10, 1966.
8 1 However, the Board transmits confidential information to the appropriate committees
with the request that confidentiality be safeguarded. Id.
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complaint in other regulated areas of the economy where legislation
comparable to section 1104 does not exist. The regulatory agencies in
those areas have discretion to furnish the Congress with information
obtained by them in confidence." Thus, what the agencies give, the
agencies may take away, and, because subsequent breach of confiden-
tiality is within the discretion of the agencies," resort to the courts for
injunctive relief (in the unlikely event that the businessman has prior
notice of the breach) will almost certainly prove futile.
CONCLUSION
The problem of confidential status of information made known to
government is, as -is much of the law, a necessary compromise of com-
peting values. On the one hand there is the value to a person, whether
or not a businessman, in maintaining privacy, and this is particularly
so where public disclosure will cause him incalculable harm. On the
other hand there is the value to another litigant, an administrative
agency, or a congressional committee in obtaining information on the
basis of which they may prepare or decide a case, promulgate a regula-
tion, or enact legislation. The compromise achieved at this juncture is
the receipt of information in confidence whenever it can be shown that
the harm done to the individual outweighs the possible good to society
by disclosure. This is not a perfect compromise, and it begs many ques-
tions-but this is true of most compromises.
The authors, having examined the practices, both formal and infor-
mal, of the principal federal government agencies, propose the follow-
ing model regulation which provides answers to many of the problems
posed. Again, no perfect adjustment of competing interests can be
made therein-for there is no regulation which will entirely satisfy a
need for both disclosure and confidentiality. But it provides a proce-
dural mechanism for arriving at solutions which we contend are better
than that now achieved by most federal agencies.
8 2 This discretion is limited only by § 4 of the Federal Reports Act which prohibits the
disclosure of confidential information except as is authorized by law. 44 U.S.C. § 423(b)
(Supp. 1I, 1965-1966). Fines up to $1000 or imprisonment for one year or both and manda-
tory removal from office are provided for violation of the Act. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1964).
Federal statutes, however, generally confer upon the agencies, as opposed to their individual per-
sonnel, discretion to release confidential information. Hence, the agencies may make such
information available to Congress upon proper requests. 41 OP. Ar'Y GEN. 221, 228
(1955). But since agency discretion is involved, the agencies are not compelled to honor these
requests. Id. at 228-29; cf. Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1900).
83 The "Freedom of Information Act" expressly states that its requirements "shall not be
applicable to matters that are... (4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information
obtained from any person and privileged or confidential .... ." Administrative Procedure
Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b) (1967). Since such confidential information is not dealt with
by the act, it appears that the agencies' discretion to withhold or release it remains intact.
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APPENDIX




SECTION I OBJECTION TO DISCLOSURE OF ALLEGED BUSI-
NESS PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED.
(a) Any interested person who objects to the public disclosure of
any business information contained in any paper filed in any proceeding
or in any oral testimony given in connection therewith shall request
the separation of such information into separate papers or transcripts
and shall request its separate filing in a sealed envelope bearing the no-
tation "Classified or Confidential Treatment Requested."
(b) In the case of oral testimony, the witness or deponent shall be
compelled to disclose the objected to information only in the presence
of the hearing examiner or the person before whom the deposition is
taken, the official stenographer and such representatives of each party
as the hearing examiner or the person before whom the deposition is
taken shall designate, and only after all persons present have been sworn
to secrecy.
(c) Within five (5) days after the making of the objection, the
objecting person shall file a formal written application for confidential
treatment of the objected to information. The application shall be
signed by the objecting person or by his authorized representative and
shall contain a general description of the information sought to be with-
held and a detailed statement of the reasons for the request for confi-
dentiality. This application shall 'be filed with the person conducting
the hearing or proceeding. Written notice of the application shall be
served on all persons interested in the proceedings or their authorized
representatives, but the application itself need not be served. The per-
son with whom the application is filed shall maintain the application
in confidence until such time as the objected to information is itself pub-
licly disclosed.
(d) Within five (5) days of service of the notice of the filing of
the application, any interested party may request a hearing on the appli-
cation or the person conducting the proceeding may order such hearing
sua sponte. This hearing shall be held in camera with all persons pres-
ent sworn to secrecy.
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SECTION II DETERMINATION OF APPLICATION TO OBTAIN
CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT; STANDARD OF PROOF TO BE EM-
PLOYED; BURDEN OF PROOF; RECEIPT OF OTHER EVIDENCE
PENDING DETERMINATION OF REQUEST FOR CONFIDENTIAL
TREATMENT.
(a) The person conducting the hearing or proceeding shall decide
the application for confidentiality with due regard to the public's interest
in full disclosure of the Agency's proceedings and the interests of the
applicant in maintaining secrecy of the information sought to be kept
confidential. The burden of proof shall be on the applicant to establish
the need for confidential treatment.
(b) The person conducting the hearing or proceeding may deter-
mine that, during a contest before the agency or in court over whether
certain evidence shall be received publicly or in camera, the administra-
tive hearing or proceeding shall proceed for the reception of other evi-
dence.
SECTION III PROCEDURES FOLLOWING THE GRANT OF AN
APPLICATION FOR CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT.
(a) An order granting an application for confidential treatment
shall specify the date on which such treatment will expire and shall in-
dude a statement of the reasons for granting the application and a gen-
eral description of the material to be held in confidence.
(b) Documents and transcripts of testimony subject to such order
shall ,be placed in a parallel nonpublic docket and filed in a sealed en-
velope bearing the notation "Classified or Confidential Treatment
Granted" and the date on which in camera treatment expires and the
documents and testimony are to be placed in the public docket.
(c) For good cause found, the person conducting the hearing or
proceeding may permit a party -thereto to disclose in camera documents
or testimony to experts, consultants, or witnesses to be utilized in the
hearing or proceedings, but an order shall be entered protecting the
rights of the affected parties and preventing unnecessary disclosure.
(d) In the submittal of proposed findings, briefs or other papers,
counsel for all parties should make a good faith attempt to refrain
from disclosing the specific details of in camera documents and testi-
mony, but generalized references thereto and general statements con-
cerning them is permissible. Proposed findings, briefs or other papers
containing detailed confidential information shall be marked "confiden-
tial" and made part of the parallel nonpublic docket.
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SECTION IV PROCEDURES FOLLOWING THE DENIAL OF AN
APPLICATION FOR CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT.
(a) An order denying an application for confidential treatment
shall state the reasons for the denial and shall stay public disclosure five
(5) days in order to permit the applicant to file an interlocutory appeal
from the adverse order with the agency's final decisional body. If such
appeal is filed within that time, public disclosure shall be stayed until
the final decisional body disposes of the appeal.
(b) If that body refuses to consider the interlocutory appeal or af-
firms the order of the hearing examiner, it shall stay public disclosure
for five (5) days from the date of its order to permit judicial review.
If an action is filed in the appropriate United States district court within
that time, public disclosure shall be stayed until completion of judicial
review.
SECTION V RELEASE OF CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMA-
TION BY THE AGENCY.
(a) The Agency shall not disclose publicly any information or-
dered held in confidence until the expiration of the period during which
the information is to be so held.
(b) However, the Agency, on its own motion and without notice
to any affected party, may make in camera documents and testimony
available for inspection, copying or use on a confidential basis by agen-
cies of the federal or state governments. In making such material avail-
able to other agencies, the Agency shall request that the confidentiality
of the material be respected.
(c) Upon the request of any duly authorized committee of the
Congress, the Agency shall make available to the committee confidential
documents and transcripts of testimony without regard to the use to
which the material may be put by the committee. But in making such
material available to committees of the Congress, the Agency shall in-
form the committee that the material furnished is confidential and shall
request that the committee not reveal the contents of the material pub-
licly.
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